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Executive summary
We created a probabilistic decision analysis tool to model the issue of resilience in 
the Horn of Africa through a cooperative effort between the Technical Consortium 
for Building Resilience in the Horn of Africa (TC) and Hubbard Decision Research 
(HDR). The work was carried out under the guidance of Katie Downie from the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). The objective was to provide a 
modeling framework to provide guidance for what should be measured to best 
support future decisions related to household and community resilience in 
the Horn of Africa. The quantitative methods used are supported by published 
research showing how these methods provide a measurable improvement on 
expert decisions done without the aid of such models.
The process we use for improving decision quality is based on a probabilistic risk 
return analysis called Applied Information Economics, which uses Monte Carlo 
simulations to produce a distribution of potential outcomes. This method allows 
the potential stakeholder to consider uncertainty explicitly and to calculate the risk 
of a negative outcome or loss. Another primary output of an Applied Information 
Economics model is the calculation of the economic value of information for each 
uncertain variable.  By collecting information values for interventions related to 
resilience, we can identify priorities for research and data collection related to 
investments in promoting resilience. 
Preparations for the project were started in June 2013, followed by a July 
workshop in Nairobi. The workshop included training on the AIE method including 
“calibrating” all workshop attendees. From the workshop we also selected a core 
group to work on the pilot resilience model. The group met (remotely) ten times 
between	September	and	January,	2014	–	 two	meetings	 to	define	the	decision	
and pick the pilot project, six meetings for modeling and estimation, and two 
meetings for reviewing results of the model and discussing recommendations. 
This report contains a summary of our effort, gives an overview of the pilot project, 
and	presents	modeling	results.	We	conclude	with	specific	recommendation	of	next	
steps for reducing uncertainty on the project in question, as well as suggested 
course	of	action	based	on	our	findings.	
Summary of Key Observations 
 ■ At the July workshop in Nairobi, there was an initial struggle with the 
concept	of	measuring	resilience.	There	were	competing	definitions	and	the	
group	was	reluctant	to	define	resilience	without	government	stakeholders	
present.	Since	a	definition	was	crucial	to	progress,	the	core	group	eventually	
accepted	an	interim	definition	of	having	a	minimum	number	of	calories	
available to each household in a region. If a household did not meet this 
threshold in a given year, they are considered food insecure for that year, 
which in turn indicated lower resilience. The true test of resilience in the 
Horn of Africa comes during droughts when food security becomes much 
more	difficult	to	procure	–	thus	a	population	may	have	high	levels	of	food	
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security in a good year but could still have a low level of resilience. Many 
factors play into food security both during droughts and during good years 
and	these	have	been	identified	previously.1 Measuring resilience, for this 
study, is simply a matter of measuring total levels of food security over a 
long enough time frame and over all households in a region.
 ■ One of the key steps in the Applied Information Process when approached 
with a measurement problem is asking the question “why do you want to 
measure it?” The answer to this question can be quite revealing. In this 
case, the answer could have been “we want to measure resilience because 
we want to increase the level of it.” Or it could be “we want to measure the 
level of resilience, but ultimately measure the importance of resilience to 
stakeholders and the aid community relative to competing outcomes.” In 
the continuing effort to measure resilience, being clear on the outcome will 
continue to be important.
 ■ The group settled on using an irrigation project to measure levels of 
uncertainty	on	variables	related	to	resilience.	When	we	first	mentioned	
an irrigation project as an intervention to improve resilience, many of the 
workshop participants articulated a belief that irrigation projects do not 
improve resilience, or rarely do so. Interestingly, the project we modeled 
(Galana Ranch) had an average positive outcome – even considering all 
aspects of resilience and potential negative externalities associated with an 
irrigation project in the Kenyan drylands. This suggests several possibilities 
(which are not mutually exclusive):
a. This irrigation project is an especially promising example
b. Irrigation projects have both positive and negative effects on resilience
c.	The	benefits	of	irrigation	projects	that	are	unrelated	to	resilience	outweigh	
costs related to resilience
 ■ The two variables with the largest information values were related to the 
profit	margin	of	irrigated	crops,	rather	than	a	variable	more	directly	related	
to resilience (there were also three variables related to the concept of 
resilience	with	significant	information	values).	The	fact	that	the	largest	
information values were found in variables that lay outside the resilience 
focus	fits	with	previous	investigations.	It	is	an	encouraging	sign	that	
stakeholder	officials	are	independently	planning	a	10,000	acre	test	farm	for	
the project.
1 Alinovi, D’Errico, Mane, 
Romano. 2010. Livelihoods 
strategies and household 
resilience to food insecurity: 
an empirical analysis to 
Kenya. European Report on 
Development.
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1
The Challenge
The issue of measuring resilience in the Horn of Africa has proved to be a tricky 
subject.	 Part	 of	 this	 is	 due	 to	 disagreement	 over	 the	 definition	 of	 resilience.	
Without	an	agreement	on	the	definition	of	resilience	it	proves	difficult	to	measure	
or improve. However, there seem to be incontrovertible aspects to resilience 
with which nearly everyone agrees. One of these aspects is the concept of food 
security.	Since	this	concept	is	easily	defined	in	observable	terms,	it	was	a	natural	
fit	for	our	process.
Background and concepts
Climate
SHOCKS
Conflict
Drought Flood Actual/Threat
Political 
instability Price
EFFECT S
Presence of shocks may have effect on next year shocks. Autoregressive/Regressive 
coefficients	-	i.e.	does	presence	of	shock	in	one	period	>	or	<	chance	of	next	period	shock.
Each year may have 0, 1 or more shocks. Each shock has a probability and magnitude of 
effect (can be zero) on each factor. 
Factors of resilience
1) Off-farm income
2) On-farm income
3) Non-Ag Assets
*Agricultural Assets
 ■ Infrastructure
 ■Machinery
 ■Livestock
4) Support
 ■Access to Public 
Services
 ■Social Safety Nets
5) Technology
Each year shocks may have an effect on likelihood of next year shocks as well as externalities 
such as health, pollination, pest eruptions, wild food access, and other. 
Outputs after Year 1
 ■ Level of Calorie 
Availability
 ■ Changes in Assets
 ■ Changes in Other 
Factors
&
 ■ Increased/
Decreased Chance 
of Next Year Shocks
 ■ Change in Health, 
PES and Other
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Strictly speaking it is practically impossible for something to have importance if 
there are no observable consequences. Thus, it is unlikely that there are aspects 
to resilience that are important if they have no observable consequences. Most 
of	the	disagreement	on	the	definition	seems	to	stem	from	the	fact	that	the	true	
state of resilience of a population may not be known until a drought or other 
shock occurs. However, this simply means we need to model over a long enough 
time frame and estimate how different factors will contribute during a drought to 
simulate resilience over a variety of conditions.
Household Level vs Community Level Resilience
Embedded within this issue is also the decision whether to model the effects 
of an intervention on an individual household or on a community. An irrigation 
project could have catastrophic consequences for an individual household and 
yet increase the resilience in a community or a nation. This is also an important 
distinction when building a model – whether to model effects on many different 
individual households with different characteristics or to model the aggregate 
effect on food availability, income, health, and other factors.
Our solution was to create a model both for the individual household and for the 
aggregate effects of the intervention. For the Galana Ranch model, the individual 
section is only used to simulate how a single pastoralist household would fare 
given no irrigation project were to occur. These results then represent a cost to the 
extent that pastoralist households are displaced as a result of the intervention. 
Other models could be based on only the individual household level (for example 
by comparing how a selection of households fared after a given intervention); this 
might produce other interesting results on what uncertainty reductions were of 
highest value.
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Major Project Phases
For	this	project,	there	were	five	major	tasks	as	follows	(See	Appendix	A	for	detailed	
task list): 
1.	Decision	Clarification	Workshops:	This	critical	first	step	was	particularly	
challenging	because	we	first	had	to	work	through	the	definition	of	resilience	
and how that was related to investment decisions. In the end we decided to 
model a large irrigation project with special attention to variables related to 
resilience.
2. Calibrated Probability Training Workshop: This half-day workshop 
was held on site in Nairobi and all the participants were trained to 
assess uncertainties in a quantitative manner. 84% of participants were 
successfully “calibrated” at the end of the workshop so that estimates they 
gave could be expressed probabilistically. See Appendix D for more details 
on Calibration.
3. Detailed Decision Modeling Workshop(s): This work was completed 
remotely after we had decided on the Galana Ranch food security project. 
For this task, we built the detailed decision model, including both the 
household and aggregate level parts of the model. Every variable in the 
model was estimated by the “calibrated estimators.”
4. Risk/Return Analysis and Preparation of Deliverables: This takes the 
input of all previous steps to produce a quantitatively sound and complete 
analysis of the proposed investment.
5. Value of Information Analysis (VIA): This step computed the economic 
value of measuring each of the uncertain variables. The team gained 
insight regarding which variables to measure in more detail and how much 
measurement	effort	is	required	and	justified.	
Deliverables
The deliverables for this project included:
1. A detailed spreadsheet model which uses probabilistic methods to assess 
the decision
2.	A	“value	of	information”	(VIA)	analysis	showing	the	economic	benefit	of	
measuring each uncertain variable in the investment so that effort can be 
spent measuring the right things
2 Description of the process
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2 Hubbard, D. 2009. The 
Failure of Risk Management: 
Why It’s Broken and How to Fix 
It, John Wiley & Sons. 
3 Macmillan, F. 2000. 
“Risk, Uncertainty and 
Investment Decision-Making 
in the Upstream Oil and Gas 
Industry.” PhD diss., University 
of Aberdeen. 
4 Kahneman, D., Slovic P.  and 
Tversky A. , 1982. Judgement 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
3. A risk/return analysis of the proposed investment including a “probability 
distribution” of the possible returns for the project or investment and how 
the investment compares to the risk tolerance of the organization
4. Recommendations on what to measure to reduce uncertainty and risk in 
the intervention
5.	A	summary	presentation	of	the	findings
Modeling Workshops
The	modeling	workshops	begin	by	defining	the	specific	decision	that	the	group	
chooses	to	analyze.	Arguably	 the	most	 important	 (and	often	the	most	difficult)	
step is specifying what decision is actually being evaluated. As with other CGIAR 
groups, this step proved the most challenging as participants were initially 
reluctant	to	volunteer	and	settle	on	a	specific	intervention	to	model.	
Uncertainty in the model is assessed using a Monte Carlo simulation. This is a way 
of computing the uncertainty of a system or outcome given the uncertainty of the 
inputs to the model. A Monte Carlo simulation method is used for multiple reasons. 
First, there is evidence that those using Monte Carlo simulations are better at 
forecasting than those who do not.2,3 Second,	 these	decisions	have	significant	
risks and uncertainties and there is conclusive evidence that left to their own 
intuition, even quantitatively sophisticated decision makers will introduce several 
types of inference errors when it comes to the use of probabilities to describe 
uncertainty and risk.4 A Monte Carlo simulation will make the mathematics of 
these inferences explicit and avoid several types of inference errors. Finally, 
Monte Carlo simulations are often the only mathematical solution that can assess 
a large number of uncertain variables in complex relationships. 
The HDR Monte Carlo spreadsheet tool consists of an “Inputs” tab that 
summarizes all of the important variables that go into the decision. We divide the 
variables into sections and each of these sections has both certain (deterministic) 
and uncertain (probabilistic) elements. We elicit estimations of each unknown 
variable from (the now calibrated) participants and the estimations include a best 
estimate	and	a	 range	which	 represents	a	90%	confidence	 interval	or,	 in	some	
cases, binary probabilities (such as the probability of a project failure or drought 
in a given year).
The best estimate values of the variables feed into an analysis of costs and 
benefits	over	a	period	of	time	(in	this	case	20	years).	The	range	estimates	flow	
into	an	analogous	probabilistic	cash	flow	calculation	using	the	same	calculations	
and logic as the deterministic analysis.
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3 Pilot Overview: Galana Ranch Food Security Project
Table 1 summarizes the pilot chosen including the selected decision, a brief 
description of the project, and the parties involved. 
Table 1: Research Group and Project for Investigation
Focus/Group Name of 
Intervention
Core Team Description of Actual 
Project
Resilience in 
the Horn of 
Africa
Galana Ranch 
Food Security 
Project 
Dillard, Downie, 
D’Souza, 
Luedeling, Millar, 
Stull-Lane
Large scale irrigation 
project in the Kenyan 
drylands; Stakeholder: 
Kenyan Government
The Galana Ranch food security project is a proposed irrigation scheme that 
will affect 1.2 million acres in the drylands of Kenya. The project would aim to 
enhance national food security through increased productivity of the Galana and 
Kulalu	Ranches	 through	 targeted	 investments	 on	 crop,	 livestock	 and	 fisheries	
production.
The initial costs involved in this proposal include initial set-up costs for the 
irrigation and water resources infrastructure, land use planning, farm and livestock 
infrastructure, seed money for stocking and operations (farm development), an 
environmental and social impact assessment, and investments to offset potential 
negative externalities to existing and neighboring communities. Ongoing costs 
would include the annual costs associated with irrigated crops, livestock, and 
maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure.
Our	model	projects	costs	and	benefits	over	a	time	frame	of	20	years;	it	considers	
199 uncertain variables, of which 123 are unique variables. Of this total, only 
6	variables	are	 found	 to	have	an	 information	 value	significantly	different	 than	
zero. Projected results from the Galana Ranch food security project suggest that 
the	average	case	would	be	a	benefit	of	$271	million	over	twenty	years;	54%	of	
scenarios had a positive NPV. 
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We	derived	a	Net	Present	Value	by	defi	ning	and	estimating	relationships	between	
competing goals and outcomes. Although it is not necessary to use money as the 
common denominator, teams that start with a different common denominator 
usually come back to using money since it is the common element between many 
patois. The Net Present Value also necessarily references a particular perspective 
– since different actors will value different outcomes differently. In this case we 
are referencing the Net Present Value of the project from the perspective of the 
Kenyan Government who is the stakeholder in this decision.
Not only does this analysis produce a quantitative picture (Figure 2) of potential 
investment results, it also delivers another important result: it mathematically 
derives the value of reducing uncertainty on uncertain variables in the decision 
making process. Thus, even as we focused on evaluating the merits of this 
investment, the discovery of information values for the variables in this decision 
was another primary outcome of the effort.
Value of Information Findings
The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) represents the economic value of 
reducing uncertainty on a single variable. Contrary to popular belief, the value of 
information can be calculated as a dollar value. Although the term “information” is 
often used in an ambiguous manner, it can also be used as an unambiguous unit 
of	measure	with	a	well-defi	ned	value	calculation.	This	mathematical	procedure	
can be paraphrased as follows:
1. Information Reduces Uncertainty
2. Less Uncertainty Improves Decisions
3. Better Decisions Result In More Effective Actions
4.	Effective	Actions	Improve	Results	or	Profi	t
In Table 2, we list the variables with the highest EVPI for the Galana Ranch Project. 
It is important to note that the EVPI of a variable or group of variables assumes 
Figure 2: Results from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Net Present Value of the 
proposed irrigation project on the Galana Ranch
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no other variables are measured. The sum of EVPIs is not necessarily equal to 
the total expected opportunity loss in an investment. The EVPI of measuring 
two variables together could be much less or much more than the sum of the 
individual EVPIs. 
LB BE UB
Crop Revenue/Cost ratio 0.5 1.12 2.5 $130,000,000 < 1.173 37.0%
Crop Costs ($/HA) $100 $316 $1,000 $18,500,000 < $187 22.6%
Potential $ Loss 
Downstream (livelihoods 
and ecological)
$1,000,000 $6,200,000 $40,000,000 $7,400,000 > $55,100,000 2.7%
Value of preventing a 
calorie insecure household
$550 $7,500 $150,000 $1,250,000 > $857,000 0.38%
Loss of Health $10 $100 $10,000 $64,000 > $522,000 0.021%
EstimatesVariable EVPI Threshold Probability
Table 2: Variables with highest expected value of perfect information for Galana Ranch 
Project
Of the roughly 200 variables in the model, the 5 variables shown in Table 2 
have the highest information value. For each variable in the table, we include 
the lower bound, best estimate, and upper bound estimates given by calibrated 
participants, the expected value of perfect information (EVPI), the threshold for 
each variable and the probability the variable takes a value beyond the threshold.
The largest EVPI was for the variable “crop revenue/cost ratio” which had a value 
of	perfect	information	of	$130	million	dollars.	It	is	rare	to	encounter	information	
values this high in investment decisions but several determinants contribute to 
its size:
1. The irrigation project analysis is based on 1.2 million acres over 20 years 
which	means	potential	costs	and	benefits	per	acre	have	a	large	multiplier
2. The initial costs alone could add up to over a hundred million dollars
3. Annual costs (considering both direct crop costs and negative 
externalities) could cost additional hundreds of millions of dollars a year
4. The investment is highly uncertain; in 46% of outcomes the project would 
represent a net loss (occasionally in the billions of dollars)
Given	 this	 additional	 information,	 a	 value	 of	 information	 of	 $130	 million	 no	
longer seems so unbelievable. However given how cheap it would be to reduce 
uncertainty	on	this	variable,	it	does	seem	remarkable	that	we	would	find	such	a	
high value.
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Estimates
As with every other uncertain variable in the model, we collected estimates 
representing	a	90%	confidence	interval	of	the	participants	involved	in	this	project.	
This	means,	participants	were	90%	confident	that	the	range	contained	or	would	
contain (many of the estimates are referencing future events) the actual answer. 
As an example, for the variable “crop revenue/crop ratio,” participants were 90% 
confident	that	the	range	of	0.5	to	2.5	contained	the	actual	crop	revenue	to	cost	
ratio. Note that this was considering only the annual recurring costs and revenues 
associated with growing crops in the relevant region. This range (corresponding to 
a	profit	from	growing	crops	of	anywhere	between	a	50%	loss	to	a	150%	gain)	may	
seem quite wide to someone unfamiliar with the AIE process, but the participants 
were estimating their current state of uncertainty, and they had been trained to 
do so accurately through calibration training. It is common practice to use narrow 
ranges, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they are more useful. A narrow range 
given by an un-calibrated participant would not allow us to have any assignable 
confidence	in	the	likelihood	it	would	be	correct.
Threshold and Probability
The	“threshold”	is	simply	the	value,	past	which	the	project	flips	to	being	a	net	loss	
from	a	net	benefit.	The	“probability”	is	the	chance	that	the	variable	takes	such	
a value given the estimates provided. So if the crop revenue/cost ratio was less 
than 1.173, then the net outcome of the irrigation project would be negative, and 
given estimates there is a 37% chance that the true value is below this threshold.
For the variable entitled “value of preventing a food insecure household” the 
threshold	is	$857,000,	meaning	that	the	value	of	this	variable	would	need	to	be	
higher	than	$857,000	to	flip	the	average	outcome	from	a	positive	to	a	negative.	
The logic of this works as follows:
1. irrigation project displaces a pastoralist household
2. that household then has trouble securing other sources of income or food
3. this household then experiences food insecurity it otherwise would not 
     have
4. this food insecurity is counted as a negative externality of the project 
Since there is a major push to increase resilience, we wanted to account for the 
decrease in resilience this represented (at least for this household). There could 
be a number of costs, explicit or otherwise, from a household becoming food 
insecure. Most obviously, there could be explicit costs to the member government 
or aid community of providing for this household above and beyond normal 
channels to ensure their food security. In addition, the members of the household 
are likely at greater risk to disease from stress and lack of nutrition; there may 
also be an elevated risk of mortality, an elevated risk of disillusionment leading 
to violence, and other negative externalities. Some of these possibilities are more 
likely than others, but participants were asked to estimate the aggregate average 
value of preventing food insecurity for a single household, considering all of these 
potential factors. 
The	 estimate	 that	 the	 group	 settled	 on	 was	 a	 lower	 bound	 of	 $550	 and	 an	
upper	bound	of	$150,000	with	a	lognormal	distribution.	Given	these	estimates,	
it would seem exceedingly unlikely that the true value of preventing a food 
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insecure	household	to	the	Kenyan	government	would	exceed	$857,000;	indeed,	
this	 intuition	 is	verified	by	the	probability	of	exceeding	this	threshold	–	a	mere	
0.38%. In spite of this small probability however, note there is still a large value in 
reducing uncertainty further on this variable.
The Measurement Inversion
It is also noteworthy that of all the variables in the model, the value of preventing 
food insecurity is the variable most closely related to the concept of resilience. 
We	might	therefore	expect	a	model	meant	to	focus	on	resilience	would	find	this	
variable to have the highest information value. Instead, the value of reducing 
uncertainty on this variable is less than 1% of the value of reducing uncertainty on 
the	level	of	profit	derived	from	irrigated	crop	land.	This	is	an	interesting	result	and	
could	be	seen	as	disappointing.	Nevertheless,	it	fits	into	a	general	observation	
we have found with all CGIAR projects and across a variety of other government 
and industry investment decisions. The stated focus of a group is usually not the 
variable most in need of uncertainty reduction.
Comparing the value of information results with the information values from other 
CGIAR projects shows there are some important similarities. In the construction 
of	 the	 Global	 Intervention	 Decision	 Model	 we	 identified	 six	 potential	 gaps	 in	
current measurement efforts (Appendix C): market prices, project failure risks, 
negative consequences, adoption rates, detailed household demographics, and 
land properties. 
The two highest value variables in the Galana Ranch Project (crop costs and 
crop	revenue/cost	 ratio)	 fall	 into	 the	first	category	of	market	prices5. All of the 
remaining	 variables	 fit	 into	 the	 category	 of	 negative	 consequences:	 negative	
downstream effects, health costs, and costs associated with increasing food 
insecurity for pastoralists are all examples of how a project might actually have 
an overall detrimental effect with a loss much greater than merely losing the 
invested resources. Additionally, the highest information value variable (the 
possibility	of	a	negative	profit	on	irrigated	crops)	falls	into	this	category	as	well;	
after all if growing irrigated crops is a losing proposition, then losses will likely 
extend beyond the initial investment.
 
5 Crop costs and revenues aren’t precisely market prices but are made up of other variables 
that are market prices such as input costs for growing irrigated crops, and average yields and 
prices	for	the	finished	crops	in	the	region	of	the	pilot	project
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4
Recommended next steps
The most urgent recommendation is to carry out the next step in the Applied 
Information Economics process, namely to make measurements on the variables 
where	there	 is	an	economic	 justification	for	doing	so.	 Involving	stakeholders	 is	
also a critical next step – the values we are measuring are representative for 
the	stakeholder	who	is	making	the	investment	and	who	will	reap	the	benefits	or	
losses associated with the project.
Reduce uncertainty
Now that information values have been computed for an initial pilot project, 
decomposition and measurements should begin. The best approach will be 
small, incremental measurements prioritized by their EVPIs.
1. Crop Revenue/Cost Ratio, EVPI $130,000,000:
 ■ Decompose variable; this is a case where decomposing into individual crops 
may	significantly	reduce	uncertainty	and	is	a	very	low	cost	strategy
 ■ Substitute	a	profit	per	hectare	instead	of	a	crop	revenue/cost	ratio
 ■ Estimate	profit	per	hectare	for	maize,	sugar,	and	horticulture	separately
 ■ Given	the	size	of	the	information	variable,	a	small	sample	of	average	profit	
levels	over	20	years	in	a	comparable	environment	would	be	justified	for	
each major crop or crop type. 
 ■ It is encouraging that the stakeholders involved in the Galana Ranch project 
have planned a 10,000 acre pilot farm on part of the property to measure 
outcomes using the proposed technologies and crops. It could be that a 
quicker	and	less	expensive	method	would	reduce	uncertainty	sufficiently.
2. Crop Costs ($/HA), EVPI $18,500,000:
 ■ If the recommendations above are taken, the crop cost variable will be 
replaced.	We	recommend	replacing	crop	costs	and	profit	ratio	for	an	
aggregate	crop	variable	with	profit	per	hectare	variables	for	individual	crops
3. Potential Loss Downstream (livelihoods and ecological), EVPI 
$6,200,000:
 ■ Decompose downstream ecological and livelihood loss. Again, we don’t 
need to make measurements until we have better separated out the 
components of this variable:
 ■ Estimate downstream livelihood types for downstream populations of each 
livelihood type
 ■ Estimate chance of livelihood disruption and opportunity cost for each 
livelihood type if disrupted
 ■ Estimate ecological losses separately
4. Value of Preventing Food Insecure Household, EVPI $1,250,000:
 ■ Refine	definition	of	variable	and	conduct	small	sample	of	stakeholders
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 ■ Better	define	the	levels	and	effects	of	food	insecurity.	Would	different	aid	
organizations	and	countries	provide	identical	definitions	and	effects	of	a	
“food	insecure	household”?	If	not,	create	more	specific	variable(s)	with	
observable qualities and outcomes.
 ■ Conduct a small sample of aid workers and members of stakeholder 
governments to determine the value of preventing food insecurity, once it is 
clearly	defined.
Involve Stakeholders in the Process
An obvious shortcoming of this effort was the lack of presence from the 
stakeholder. Whether the effort to use the Applied Information Economics process 
is to help measure resilience in the Horn of Africa or to help prioritize research 
topics, projects, and groups in CGIAR, involving stakeholder governments and aid 
organizations is a natural next step for two reasons.
1. The information values necessarily reference the entity making the 
investment	–	stakeholders	are	actually	the	group	that	stands	to	benefit	
most directly from these analyses.
2. Collaboration with stakeholders may dramatically change the results 
and what is found to have the highest information value. There may be 
a complementary knowledge base in the stakeholder community that 
can immediately begin to inform the metrics effort on the CGIAR side. 
Stakeholders could also be an aid in carrying out the measurement step 
of	the	AIE	process	as	they	have	both	a	more	direct	financial	resource	and	
incentive to do so.
Combine Efforts with Other CGIAR Analyses
Identify ways that rule of thumb estimates can be applied for variables like crop 
profit	 levels.	 It	may	be	that	differences	between	projects	and	regions	could	be	
exaggerated and that the uncertainty can be dramatically reduced with a couple 
of inputs such as annual rainfall and average travel distance to market.
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Appendix A
Project Task Detail
Approximate 
Relative Effort
Phase
As % of All 
Phases
As % of 
Phase
Task
20% Conduct the Initial Assessment of the Current Environment
50% Initial Research and Scope: Understand the background and 
begin work to understand the decision problem.
30% Assess Existing Data: Determine the extent of existing 
historical data.
20% Identify	Resources	and	Define	Responsibilities:	Typical	
stakeholders	and	their	objectives	will	be	identified.	Roles	
and	responsibilities	of	individuals	will	be	defined.
40% Define	Decision	and	Model	the	Current	State	of	Uncertainty
25% Decision	Problem	Definition:	In	the	first	workshop,	the	
experts	identify	what	specific	problem	they	are	trying	to	
analyze. List what variables play a role in determining 
resiliency.
25% Complete Necessary Training: Introduce the group to the 
principles of Applied Information Economics (AIE) and 
conduct calibration training.
25% Decision Model Detail: By the second workshop, using an 
Excel spreadsheet, we list all of the factors that matter in the 
decision	being	analyzed	and	begin	to	define	how	they	relate.
25% Initial Calibrated Estimates: Obtain estimates from the 
calibrated experts for the variables in the decision model. 
These	values	are	not	fixed	points	(unless	values	are	known	
exactly), rather they are calibrated expert range estimates. 
All quantities are expressed as a range representing the 
experts’	90%	confidence	interval	(CI).
40% Identify What to Measure and Integrate Model into the IDM 
Framework
50% Calculate VIAs for each model input variable.
  50% Provide recommendations on what to measure and integrate 
this model into the Intervention Decision Model (IDM) 
framework.
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Appendix B 
The Proposed Decision 
Method: Applied Information 
Economics
The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), one of the research centers of the CGIAR, 
has	identified	a	consolidated	approach	that	will	address	three	of	the	challenges	
facing research institutions in sustainable agricultural practice; these challenges 
are:
 ■ Estimating the impact of intervention
 ■ Determining how to measure agro-ecosystem health
 ■ Showing the value of research. 
The solution will involve the use of HDR’s primary method called Applied 
Information Economics. Applied Information Economics (AIE) was developed as 
a robust method for addressing investment dilemmas that are large, risky, and 
full	of	difficult	measurements.	It	is	designed	to	perform	even	in	the	presence	of	
“intangibles”	and	significant	uncertainty.	This	approach	is	well	suited	to	developing	
world agricultural research because decisions often involve opaque actors (e.g., 
stakeholder governments), poor and/or unreliable data (e.g., pastoralist regions), 
and	effects	that	are	perceived	as	difficult	to	measure	(e.g.,	the	effect	of	climate	
change on agriculture).
Unlike traditional methods that produce arbitrary “scores” or deterministic 
returns on investment, AIE conducts a true Risk/Return analysis with the same 
degree of rigor used by actuaries to estimate loss rates in insurance pools. The 
method	involves	five	steps	–	(1)	define	the	decision(s),	(2)	model	what	we	know	
now, (3) compute the value of information, (4) measure what matters, and (5) 
make better decisions.
AIE combines several methods from decision theory, economics, actuarial 
science, and other mathematical methods. The method has been widely used in 
business, governmental, and NGO settings – in decisions as diverse as wildlife 
preservation,	mine	flooding,	and	IT	security.	AIE	makes	use	of	methods	that	have	
been shown to improve on human expert judgments in multiple independent 
studies. Here is a brief summary of the method:
 ■ Define the Decision(s): 
As	obvious	as	this	step	may	first	appear,	it	is	the	key	to	better	understanding	
what	to	measure,	and	real	decisions	are	often	different	from	what	they	first	
appear to be. Is the dilemma whether to simply approve a project or how 
to conduct a project given a vast combination of alternatives? Or is the 
decision a matter of when a given initiative should be approved?  The costs, 
benefits,	timing,	risks	and	even	external	factors	are	identified	and	the	real	
decision	is	clarified.	
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 ■ Model What We Know Now: 
Cost	estimates,	forecasts	of	benefits,	project	risks,	and	other	variables	
in a typical big investment decision are almost never known exactly. The 
uncertainty about some variables, especially long term forecasts, can seem 
extreme. But the consequences of even extremely uncertain variables can 
be assessed using the “Monte Carlo” method and a special approach for 
training experts to assess probabilities. The Monte Carlo method is useful 
for conducting decision analysis by sampling variables that do not have 
exactly known values (i.e. most variables in a model). This initial model is 
effectively a snapshot of the current state of uncertainty about a problem 
before additional measurements are made.
 ■ Compute the Value of Information: 
Not all variables in a decision model are worth measuring and those worth 
measuring are often a surprise to the decision makers. In fact, normally 
a kind of “measurement inversion” exists in most decisions – that is, the 
most uncertain variables tend to be ignored while the variables that usually 
receive a lot of attention actually have less bearing on the decision. With 
AIE, every variable in a model will have an “information value” that allows 
identification	of	high	value	variables	in	a	decision.	This	approach	targets	
only	the	variables	in	a	decision	that	are	the	most	likely	to	significantly	
reduce overall uncertainty in the decision.
 ■ Measure What Matters: 
Once	the	high-value	measurements	are	identified,	a	variety	of	empirical	
methods can be used. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, relatively 
little data or simple observations may be required for extremely uncertain 
variables.	AIE	often	uses	efficient	“Bayesian”	methods,	which	exploit	
prior knowledge and can be used even when data is messy or sparse. 
The measured variables will have less uncertainty and then the model of 
uncertainty can be updated.
 ■ Make Better Decisions: 
The output of the Monte Carlo model, updated with targeted measurements, 
is compared to the risk/return preferences of the organization. Research 
shows that the actual risk aversion and other preferences of decision 
makers change frequently and unconsciously. Different preferences are 
applied to different investments even when management believes they 
are being consistent. AIE addresses this major source of decision error by 
quantifying and documenting preferences such as risk tolerance and the 
value	of	deferred	benefits	so	that	the	results	of	analysis	can	be	assessed	
in a controlled, uniform manner. Finally, sometimes decisions have large 
combinations of outcomes and have to be part of a portfolio of decisions. 
When necessary, AIE applies optimization methods to determine the best 
decision even from a large set of alternatives. The AIE process can help 
scientists and planners to clarify and improve intervention decisions even in 
complex multi-stakeholder situations.  
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Appendix C 
Potential Gaps in Current 
Measurement Efforts (GIDM)
In 2013, we produced a Global Intervention Decision Model (GIDM) through a 
cooperative effort between the CGIAR and Hubbard Decision Research (HDR). 
The objective was to provide a modeling framework to support future decisions 
and to provide guidance for what should be tracked in a metrics database. One 
of	the	outcomes	of	the	work	was	that	we	identified	6	potential	gaps	in	current	
measurement efforts:
 ■ Market Prices: 
Anything regarding a market price – such as bulk chemicals, crop market 
prices, the price of carbon offsets, and labor costs – has not been a focus 
of data gathering. Yet, a market price for some item had one of the highest 
information values in four of the six pilots. During the pilot project analysis, 
scientists felt somewhat uncomfortable even giving broad estimates for 
market	prices	of	any	kind.	Clearly	this	was	outside	of	their	field	of	expertise	
and other sources for this sort of data should be utilized. 
 ■ Project Failure Risks:
The two pilot projects that included some type of probability of project failure 
showed a high information value for that risk. This is also consistent with 
other observations of information values on projects in many industries and 
government agencies. It is likely that had other projects included the risk of 
failure that this would have been one of the high information values in those 
projects as well. Project failure risks include probability of total cancellation 
of the project (failure to complete with nothing to show), radical reduction 
in scope (cancellation of parts of the original plan after expenditures on 
those parts had been made) and massive delays. Data collection about 
success rates of projects and predictive models for projects with various 
characteristics will be key.
 ■ Negative Consequences: 
For some projects there is the possibility that the project actually has an 
overall detrimental effect with a loss much greater than merely losing the 
invested resources. Projects that intensify farming practices for near-term 
benefits	but	with	long	term	costs	could	fall	into	this	category.	This	is	a	type	
of project failure risk but in this case the original project was successfully 
completed but with unintended results. Variables related to this also tend 
to have high EVPIs in many industries and organizations. Again, historical 
project characteristics and outcomes could be gathered to reduce this 
uncertainty.
 ■ Adoption Rates: 
Most interventions require some sort of change in behavior of a population. 
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If households do not adopt farming techniques, policies, and technologies, 
then	the	benefits	may	never	materialize.	Understanding	and	predicting	the	
adoption characteristics of a population (see Appendix D) will be a recurring 
uncertainty in many interventions. This is also an observation that is very 
consistent	with	EVPI	calculations	in	other	fields	in	business	and	government.	
 ■ Detailed Household Demographics: 
There were recurring uncertainties about details of households and 
individual	farms	that	had	significant	bearing	on	intervention	decisions.	The	
decisions of individual households on urban migration, the sizes of their 
farms, the number and type of livestock and other types of demographic 
information were required for the analysis. This sort of information is already 
gathered	in	some	programs	but	this	project	finds	that	for	some	intervention	
decisions a higher resolution and broader scope of this data may be 
required. There is a lot of data that could be gathered, but even small 
samples	of	the	population	would	have	been	informative.	The	specific	data	
gathered should be driven by the information values.
 ■ Land Properties: 
The	specific	size	of	different	lands,	density	of	trees,	erosion	rates	and	other	
characteristics of the land had high EVPIs in some projects. This is also 
information that is gathered to some degree already but the information 
values indicate that higher resolutions of this data may be required for 
some decisions. A Geographic Information System (GIS) type of data base 
may	be	the	ideal	format	but	the	data	gathered	should	be	driven	by	specific	
information values.
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8 Appendix D An Introduction to Calibration
The order of our workshops is an important aspect of the process. Calibration 
workshops come before detailed decision modeling because AIE decision models 
are built with ranges of uncertainty on many of the variables. Therefore, before 
a subject matter expert or participant can contribute ranges on a variable, they 
must be able to accurately assess their uncertainty. This skill – the ability to 
accurately assess one’s uncertainty – can be taught and we call this process 
“calibration.” 
Following methods designed by various academic researchers6,7 and Doug 
Hubbard8, experts can measure how well they subjectively assess uncertainty 
with explicit probabilities. The vast majority of people enter training in a state of 
overconfidence	–	they	predict	 they	will	be	correct	more	often	than	they	are.	 In	
other	words,	when	most	people	say	they	are	90%	confident	in	each	of	some	large	
number	of	predictions,	the	frequency	of	correct	answers	will	be	significantly	less	
than 90%. Once an initial assessment has been conducted, experts learn several 
techniques for achieving a measurable improvement in estimating. By the end of 
a 3-hour training workshop, 85-90% of participants achieve a state of calibration 
– that is, they are able to give estimates that are correct as often as they predict 
them to be. Even those who don’t achieve calibration in the workshop can still 
participate	once	their	overconfidence	has	been	measured.	
The experience with the researchers was consistent with observed results for 
professionals	 in	 many	 other	 fields.	 Virtually	 all	 researchers	 started	 out	 in	 a	
state	of	extreme	overconfidence	about	their	estimates.	But	after	training,	most	
were performing to almost an ideal level of calibration (i.e., they could not be 
statistically differentiated from ideally calibrated persons given the sample size 
of estimates they provided).
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Building Resilience in the Horn of Africa
The Technical Consortium for Building Resilience in the Horn of Africa provides technical 
support to IGAD and member states in the Horn of Africa on evidence-based planning and 
regional and national investment programs, for the long-term resilience of communities 
living in arid and semi-arid lands. It harnesses CGIAR research and other knowledge on 
interventions in order to inform sustainable development in the Horn of Africa. 
www.technicalconsortium.org
CGIAR is a global agricultural research partnership for a food-secure future. Its science is
carried out by 15 research centres that are members of the CGIAR Consortium in
collaboration with hundreds of partner organizations. www.cgiar.org
The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) works to improve food security and
reduce poverty in developing countries through research for better and more sustainable
use of livestock. ILRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium, a global research partnership
of 15 centres working with many partners for a food-secure future. ILRI has two main
campuses in East Africa and other hubs in East, West and Southern Africa and South,
Southeast and East Asia. www.ilri.org
